KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH OF THE METHODOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE

ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE HERITAGE & COMMEMORATION CENTER (IICC)

מעצבים את העתיד מאז 1925
האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

IFIS

הפורום הישראלי ללימודי מודיעין [פיל"ם]

הכנס הישראלי השנתי ללימודי מודיעין 2025

The Annual Israeli Conference on Intelligence Studies 2025

בסימן השתנות בעקבות כישלון

Intelligence Transformations After Failure

29/10/2025

האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

תוכניה
PROGRAM

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
לתוכניה יש לגלול למטה

הכנס הישראלי השנתי ללימודי מודיעין 2025

יום ד', 29/10/2025

בניין מדעי היהדות ע"ש יצחק רבין, קמפוס הר הצופים,
האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים

09:00-09:30	**התכנסות ורישום**
09:30-11:15	**פאנלים מחקריים, מושב 1:** 1א'. **אי-ודאות והפתעה.** חדר 3001 1ב'. **הפוליטיקה הבינלאומית של המודיעין.** חדר 2001 1ג'. **פיקוח על מודיעין.** חדר 1001
11:15-11:30	**הפסקת קפה**
11:30-13:15	**פאנלים מחקריים, מושב 2:** 2א'. **השקת ספר המודיעין וה-7 באוקטובר.** חדר 3001 2ב'. **מודיעין ובינה מלאכותית.** חדר 2001 2ג'. **אתגרים ללמידה בארגוני מודיעין.** חדר 1001
13:15-14:00	**הפסקת צהריים**
14:00-15:00	**מושב מליאה,** אולם ווסונג • דברי ברכה • טקס הענקת פרסי הפורום הישראלי ללימודי מודיעין לשנת תשפ"ה • **הרצאה מפי אלוף (דימ') אהרון זאבי-פרקש,** יו"ר המרכז למורשת המודיעין וראש אמ"ן לשעבר
15:00-16:00	**פאנל בנושא פיקוח על קהילת המודיעין מול שמירה על עצמאותה,** אולם ווסונג **מנחים: ד"ר אופק רימר ושירה ברביבאי-שחם,** אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב **עו"ד דבורה חן,** לשעבר ראש המחלקה לעניינים פליליים-ביטחוניים ועניינים מיוחדים בפרקליטות המדינה **ח"כ רם בן ברק,** לשעבר יו"ר ועדת החוץ והביטחון וסגן ראש המוסד **חכ"ל יוחנן פלסנר,** נשיא המכון הישראלי לדמוקרטיה




The Annual Israeli Conference on Intelligence Studies 2025

Wednesday, 29/10/2025

,Yitzhak Rabin Building for Jewish Studies, Mt. Scopus
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

09:00–09:30	**Reception & Registration**
09:30–11:15	**Academic panels, Session 1** • 1a. **Uncertainty & Surprise,** Room 3001 • 1b. **The International Politics of Intelligence,** Room 2001 • 1c. **Intelligence Oversight,** Room 1001
11:15–11:30	**Coffee Break**
11:30–13:15	**Academic Panels, Session 2** • 2a. **Book Launch: Israeli Intelligence and October 7** [in Hebrew], Room 3001 • 2b. **Intelligence & AI,** Room 2001 • 2c. **Inhibited Learning in Intelligence Organizations,** Room 1001
13:15–14:00	**Lunch Break**
14:00–15:00	**Plenary Session,** Wassong Auditorium • Welcome Remarks • Awards Ceremony • **Keynote Speech by Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash**, Chairman of the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center and Former Head of IDF Intelligence Directorate
15:00–16:00	**Roundtable Discussion on Balancing Intelligence Oversight and Independence,** Wassong Auditorium **Moderators: Dr. Ofek Riemer and Shira Barbibay-Shaham**, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev **Adv. Devorah Chen**, former Director of the Department for Criminal, Security, and Special Affairs in the State Attorney. **MK Ram Ben-Barak,** Former Chair of the Foreign Affairs & Defense Committee of the Knesset and Deputy Director of the Mossad **FMK Yohanan Plesner,** President of the Israel Democracy Institute



The Annual Israeli Conference on Intelligence Studies 2025

הפאנלים המחקריים
The Academic Panels

Session First 09:30–11:15 מושב ראשון

Panel1 A :Uncertainty and Surprise ,Room 3001

Chair & discussant :Prof .Uri Bar-Joseph ,University of Haifa
Discussant: Dr. Daniel Sobelman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Asymmetric Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction :An Info-Gap Analysis

Prof. Yakov Ben-Haim, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Protagonists in strategic interaction face uncertainty about the adversary's intentions and capabilities, and sometimes about their own, and about the general situation. We consider asymmetric uncertainty: both protagonists face significant uncertainty, but one faces much more than the other. Different degrees of uncertainty can motivate different behavior. We explore two responses to uncertainty. Robust satisficing attempts to ameliorate pernicious uncertainty and to obtain an essential outcome. Opportune windfalling attempts to exploit propitious uncertainty and to obtain a better than anticipated outcome. We explore these two strategies both quantitatively and qualitatively. We prove two propositions: The protagonist facing greater uncertainty has worse robustness for achieving a critical outcome (proposition 1) but has better opportuneness for achieving a windfall outcome (proposition 2). We apply these ideas qualitatively to the Cuban missile crisis and to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Certainty ,Uncertainty ,and Technology in Surprise

Ms. Lee Amram-Eilat, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Janice Gross Stein, University of Toronto

Findings from the IDF's internal investigation into the surprise of October 7, 2023 that have been made public highlighted an illusion of certainty and an over-reliance on technology but did not explicitly connect the two. This paper examines this connection and argues that deep reliance on technology can generate an illusion of certainty at multiple, interconnected levels that can culminate in surprise. Technology can be an important generator of information both about an adversary's capabilities and intentions but can simultaneously mislead due to the overconfidence that it generates among decision makers that, paradoxically, hides uncertainty and reinforces their sense of control. This paper reconstructs the logic chains that led to the surprise of October 2023 to demonstrate this paradox. Over-reliance on technology in intelligence contributed to the illusion of certainty at multiple levels. Reports and investigations of the attack show, however, that technology either failed, was dismissed due to institutional shortcomings, or was misinterpreted. These findings are consequential for the explanation and practices of intelligence estimation and strategic planning as we move rapidly into an era of deeper integration of human and machine intelligence.

Rethinking Deception and Surprise :The October 7 Attack as a Case Study

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Itai Brun, Tel Aviv University, and Ms. Michal Roitman

This research offers an updated perspective on the phenomena of deception and surprise, using the October 7 Hamas attack as a case study. It examines deception as a perceptual phenomenon that significantly contributes to shaping the victim's understanding. Based on original materials cleared for publication, the study identifies three components of Hamas' deception: the concealment of strategic intentions and operational preparations; the transmission of false signals that deepened Israel's misperception of reality and eroded the diagnostic value of warning signs; and the use of authentic routine behavior that served both legitimate purposes and war preparations, which Israeli analysts interpreted in ways that reinforced flawed assumptions. The study concludes that Hamas'

deception played a significant role in deepening the gap in Israel's understanding of reality. It introduces an original conceptualization of "deception's effects" that played a key role in producing three critical outcomes: "false certainty" regarding flawed assessments; "paralyzing uncertainty" on the eve of the attack; and "blindness" to major elements of the offensive. The October 7 case calls for a revised understanding of how deception contributes to strategic surprise and underscores the urgent need to implement lessons related to intelligence culture and analytical methodology.

From Kabul to Benghazi :Strategic Caution After Failure in U.S .Intelligence and Leadership During the Arab Spring

Dr. Doron Feldman, University of Texas at Austin

This paper examines how past intelligence and foreign policy failures—particularly the U.S. support for the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and the subsequent blowback culminating in 9/11—shaped American strategic restraint during the Arab Spring. It argues that the CIA and U.S. political leadership, under President Obama, internalized these earlier traumas. As a result, they adopted a cautious approach in Libya and Syria, avoiding direct support for Sunni rebel groups—even moderate ones—out of concern that history might repeat itself. The paper explores how this strategic caution reflects a deeper institutional learning process within U.S. intelligence culture, one that prioritizes long-term stability over short-term tactical gains. It raises broader theoretical question: why do some states become more cautious following intelligence failures, while others may continue to act on outdated assumptions, as seen in the Israeli intelligence collapse of October 7, 2023? In addition to empirical sources, the paper draws on international relations scholarship dealing with strategic decision-making shaped by historical analogies and the institutional processing of lessons learned. Thus, it contributes to broader debates on how intelligence cultures internalize (or fail to internalize) the lessons of past failures—and how these responses shape future policy decisions in times of crisis.

Panel1 B :The International Politics of Intelligence ,Room2001

Chair & discussant: Prof. Galia Press-Barnathan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Discussant: Prof. Danny Orbach, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Bridging the Gap :Intelligence Agencies in Foreign Policy - A Three-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing International Intelligence Relations

Ms. Stefanie Kirchweger, Bar-Ilan University

Intelligence agencies operate in complex international relations, often alongside or independently of official foreign policy. However, the connection between a state's foreign policy and its intelligence agencies' international activities remains underexplored. This study addresses this gap using Foreign Policy Analysis to propose a three-dimensional framework: the *structural dimension* examines policymakers' control over intelligence agencies' external actions; the *dispositional dimension* explores how agencies interpret and act on their mandates; and the *interactional dimension* investigates reciprocal effects between intelligence activities and foreign policy. Applying this framework to Austrian-Israeli relations in the 1970s, the study examines Soviet Jewish transmigration through Austria. Findings reveal that Austrian intelligence was fragmented from foreign policy, while Israeli intelligence was more integrated, resulting in distinct interaction patterns. Despite differences, intelligence agencies served as a secret channel during political crises. This study bridges Intelligence Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis through a systematic, comparative approach.

Russia's Legacy of Deception :Covert Warfare and Influence Operations. From Tsarist Russia to Contemporary Strategies.

Ms. Darya Khandoga, King's College London

The proposed paper explores the historical and intellectual foundations of Russian intelligence practices through the lens of strategic culture. It argues that Russia's grand strategy has long embedded

covert action—particularly deception, subversion, and infiltration—as central tools of statecraft, rather than as supplementary or last-resort measures. In contrast to Western intelligence traditions, which are often constrained by legal frameworks and democratic oversight, the Russian approach reflects a strategic culture shaped by autocracy, historical experience, and a zero-sum worldview. Drawing on Alastair I. Johnston's framework and incorporating symbol analysis, the paper traces the evolution of four key intelligence traditions: assassination (likvidatsiya), infiltration (maskirovka), subversion (myatezh), and the deployment of loyalist paramilitary forces serving the autocrat directly. From Ivan the Terrible's Oprichniki to the Soviet KGB and Putin's modern counterintelligence state, these traditions illustrate a long-standing convergence of military and intelligence functions that blurs the line between internal control and external action. The paper offers a framework for understanding Russia's enduring reliance on covert action not as tactical improvisation, but as a deliberate and culturally embedded expression of its strategic behaviour and intelligence tradition.

Public Intelligence Disclosures as a form of Strategic Communication in International Foreign Policy Bargaining

Mr. Israel Rubenstein, Tel Aviv University

When states engage in foreign policy negotiations, they often employ strategic communication to influence foreign publics and help ensure their interlocutors maintain the domestic support needed for a desired policy decision. This article examines the role of official intelligence disclosures as a mechanism for such communication. Recent technological and social developments have positioned official intelligence disclosures as a pivotal tool of governmental communication. However, theoretical frameworks for their effective use remain underdeveloped. Drawing on the literatures of norm regimes, alliances, and strategic communication in international bargaining, this study identifies the situational prerequisites for leveraging intelligence disclosures in this context. Through a case study of U.S. strategic communication prior to the 2022 Ukraine war, the analysis demonstrates that a shared meta-narrative and aligned strategic interests are key conditions for effective disclosure. When either is absent, strategies such as rhetorical coercion, performativity, and independent corroboration can enhance communicative efficacy. These findings contribute a conceptual model for refining strategic communication practices and expanding the conditions under which intelligence disclosures may be effectively deployed.

Blind Spots at Sea :Expanding HUMINT in Maritime Security to Strengthen Crisis Preparedness Against Emerging Threats in the East Mediterranean

Mr. Nicholas Moulios, University of Coventry, and Ms. Theodora Tzima, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

The Hamas attack against the State of Israel on October 7, 2023, underscored significant intelligence gaps, across collection, analysis, and early warning. One of those critical gaps lies within the maritime sector, where vital global supply chains, critical infrastructure, and offshore operations remain increasingly vulnerable to adversarial actions by state, quasi-state, and non-state actors. Notably, recent attacks by the Houthi militia in the Gulf of Aden and their ongoing threats against maritime industry operating in the area highlight the pressing need for more comprehensive intelligence coverage in these areas, with a focus on the targets' intentions and modus operandi. The Houthis' targeting of oil tankers and commercial shipping routes illustrates the emerging risks in global maritime trade corridors, and the potential for similar threats against Israel's own and allied maritime and offshore infrastructure. Analysing several intelligence failures across recent history, this paper argues for a strategic expansion of HUMINT collection strategy to cover maritime chokepoints, offshore energy platforms, and critical infrastructure in the Mediterranean. By embedding HUMINT collection capabilities within these high-risk environments, intelligence agencies can enhance their crisis preparedness and early warning capacity. Post-mortem analysis and anticipation, is essential for the Intelligence Community to address critical gaps safeguarding critical entities across eastern Mediterranean via integrating maritime HUMINT collection into its strategy, addressing maritime vulnerabilities that traditional maritime-focused intelligence collection capabilities often miss. This

paper will outline key reforms, including fostering public-private partnerships and regionally-focused multinational HUMINT collaboration, to better protect critical maritime infrastructure and prevent future attacks against maritime assets in the region.

Stopping Defections to the West: Hungarian Intelligence Failures and Reforms in the1960 s

Dr. János Kemény, Ludovika University of Public Service

The Hungarian Foreign Intelligence Service (III/I. for short) went through several shocks in the 1960s: László Szabó defected from London in 1965, Ernő Bernát defected from Washington in 1967, and a short time later the Hungarian ambassador to Washington, János Radványi defected as well. Szabó and Bernát were serving officers of III/I., while Radványi had a history of work in and with Hungarian intelligence services. These three defections were incredibly damaging for III/I. as the working assumption was, that all left out of their own free will, and thus were cooperating with the British and U.S. counterintelligence agencies. This meant, that the London and Washington (to some extent the New York) residencies had to start from scratch. The proposed presentation will aim to show based on available archival material, how the investigations highlighted bad practices inside III/I. in selecting and screening some of its operatives. Also, based on the available secondary literature, the presentation will show how new leadership was brought in to initiate a major reorganization of the whole structure of III/I. This episode of Hungarian intelligence history is a good example of how leadership and rigorous investigations into the failings can lead to substantial positive changes.

Panel1 C :Intelligence Oversight ,Room1001

Chair & discussant: Prof. Shlomo Shpiro, Bar-Ilan University

Discussant: Prof. Dr. Susanne Fischer, Federal School of Public Administration, Berlin

Changing the Perspective: The Case for Proactive Intelligence Reviews

Dr. Celia Parker-Vincent, King's College London

Significant reviews of intelligence usually come about following a failure. This dictates the nature of these reviews - knee-jerk reactions conducted in the heat of failure. Whilst the case for reviews following failures is clear (in the sense that they uncover what went wrong), what might be more effective at stopping future failures is a system of regular, proactive intelligence reviews. In the UK we see proactive defence reviews often, national security reviews sometimes, and integrated defence and security reviews no longer. We don't have proactive intelligence reviews, in public at least. In recent years Australia has started to undertake regular and semi-transparent intelligence reviews. Whilst not perfect, these have become important placeholders for thinking strategically about the composition, requirements and future travel of its intelligence community. This paper argues that other countries could learn from the Australian experience. Proactive intelligence reviews would provide an opportunity for states to think about whether their intelligence efforts are fit for purpose and respond to misalignment of resources and requirements in advance of problems with capabilities, resourcing, structure, or approach to intelligence dissemination (the intelligence/policymaker dynamic) causing an intelligence failure.

From Monopoly to Ecosystem: October 7, 9/11, and the Future of Intelligence Governance

Dr. Omar Bortolazzi, American University in Dubai

The Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, revealed systemic failures in early warning and intelligence coordination, prompting renewed scrutiny of how states govern intelligence in complex threat environments. Central to this reassessment is the growing reliance on private sector and civil society actors—hybrid entities that both complement and challenge traditional state monopoly. This paper examines the theoretical foundations and normative implications of integrating these actors into national intelligence governance. Drawing on critical security studies (Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 2006), network governance theory (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007;

Rhodes, 2007), and principal-agent models (Kiewiet, 1991; Shapiro, 2005), it explores hybrid governance designs suited to democratic contexts (Bures, 2006). Empirically, it compares Israeli intelligence failure in 2023 with U.S. reforms after 9/11 and the Iraq War, revealing the uneven operationalization of public-private-civil ecosystems—triadic models shaped by political culture and oversight. The analysis advances three arguments: intelligence is now a distributed field; integration introduces risks; and future models must embed cross-sectoral collaboration, oversight, and resilience. The paper proposes design principles grounded in pluralistic participation, interoperable infrastructures, and responsive regulation.

ISA (Israel Security Agency) in a Democratic Society: A Comparative Study

Dr. Avner Barnea, University of Haifa

The law governs the ISA's activities, defining its role and responsibilities, and outlining its purpose in national security, including its functions and powers, as well as its role in internal security, counter-terrorism, and countering domestic political subversion. Reviewing this law reveals gaps that can impact civil rights, including the absence of a clear definition of political subversion. This leaves it to the interpretation of the ISA, which can be used illegally against political opposition. A new legislative process is currently underway that will give the ISA additional power without significant oversight. A comparative study examining the status of the ISA alongside similar counterintelligence agencies in Western Democracies, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia, reveals a distinct situation. Various variables regarding the command, powers, the weight of checks and balances, and the supervision of these agencies by governmental and Parliamentary committees show that outside Israel, they are much more adequate and effective. In this paper, I show that the Israeli democratic system is at higher risk due to improper control of the ISA. This leads to considering amendments to the ISA Statute and strengthening the checks and balances system regarding this agency, as it acts in the West.

Totally New Organisations Born Out of Crises: South Africa's BOSS and the United Kingdom's SOCA

Prof. Glen Segell, NATO-EU Strategy Group

The organizational structure of government entities may undergo internal evolution after establishment; however, substantial alterations are not easily achievable unless necessitated by crises. Intelligence agencies are government departments with specific responsibilities. This paper compares two distinct cases that emerged from crises. New agencies were established with different roles, structures, and operational routines. The cases are the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the United Kingdom's Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). The former was the foreign intelligence service, while the latter was created to address the United Kingdom's needs within the European Union - domestic and foreign matters were blurred due to overlapping governance levels. When both successor agencies failed to achieve their objectives, they too were disbanded. This paper explores, in a comparative manner, the decisions made to disband these agencies instead of implementing internal changes, the criteria that influenced the roles of the new agencies and those that became obsolete, the training provided to employees, including analysts and intelligence gatherers, for their new responsibilities, and the legislative measures necessary for establishing the new agencies, which encompassed parliamentary oversight and budgetary allocations.

Putting OSINT in Context: How to Regulate Privacy in Public

Adv. Amir Cahane, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

SOCMINT presents unprecedented opportunities for intelligence gathering from publicly available social media data. While conventional privacy frameworks focused on secrecy or individual control were sufficient to regulate OSINT from mass media, the transition to social media undermines underlying assumptions of what constitutes an open source, and poses unique privacy challenges that cannot be fully addressed through existing legal frameworks. The paper outlines 3 major theoretical approaches to privacy theories: privacy as access; privacy

as control; and social approaches to privacy. The paper proceeds to discuss SOCMINT as OSINT transformed, highlighting the notion of information openness as a continuum rather than a binary, and discussing potential harms of SOCMINT. These theories are later applied to the privacy in public problem, to reveal social approaches offer valuable insights for understanding privacy in public online spaces. Drawing from a comparative review of legal materials, the Paper proposes a comprehensive framework for regulating SOCMINT. This framework acknowledges that publicly available personal data remains personal data, subject to varying degrees of openness and deserving proportionate protections. It incorporates elements from multiple privacy theories while providing practical guidelines for oversight, documentation, and authorization procedures.

Second Session 11:30–13:15 מושב שני

פאנל 2א': השקת ספר "המודיעין והשבעה באוקטובר", חדר 3001

Panel 2A: Book Launch: "Israeli Intelligence and October 7" (in Hebrew), Room 300

יו"ר: סא"ל (מיל') דוד סימן טוב, המכון לחקר המתודולוגיה של המודיעין

בין שני כישלונות: הפתעת יום הכיפורים 3791 והפתעת 7 באוקטובר 2023

פרופ' (אמריטוס) אורי בר-יוסף, אוניברסיטת חיפה

מאמר זה, מאת פרופ' אורי בר-יוסף, מבקש להשוות בין שני כשלי ההתרעה החמורים בתולדות קהילת המודיעין הישראלית: מלחמת יום הכיפורים (1973) ומתקפת חמאס (2023). חרף פערי מידע והקשרים שונים, ניתוח השוואתי של אחריות ארגונית, קונספציות שגויות, תפקוד האיסוף ותהליכי מחקר והערכה, מאפשר לזהות דפוסים דומים ושונים בשני המקרים. בעוד כשל 1973 נבע בעיקר מבעיה הערכתית, כשל 2023 שיקף במידה רבה גם כשל איסופי חריף - למרות גישה נרחבת למידע. המאמר מצביע על הזנחת תחומי איסוף קריטיים, דבקות עיוורת בקונספציה של "חמאס מורתעת" בכל הדרגים, והתעלמות ממידע איכותי שהתקבל. כמו ב־1973, גם ב־2023 כשלו מנגנוני הבקרה והספק בתוך מערכות המחקר, והדרג המדיני לא אתגר את הערכות המודיעין. התוצאה - הפתעה מוחלטת וחוסר מוכנות מהותי - מדגישה את הפער בין עוצמת יכולות המודיעין לבין חולשת השימוש בהן.

"הקול הנעלם" - כיצד תרבות ארגונית מעצבת שיח מודיעיני

סא"ל (מיל') שרית שפירא, המכון לחקר המתודולוגיה של המודיעין

סא"ל שפירא, שהייתה ראש מערך מדעי ההתנהגות של אמ"ן, תציג את מאמרה הבוחן את התרבות הארגונית באגף המודיעין והשפעתה על היכולת להביע עמדה המנוגדת לקונצנזוס. במשך השנים נבנתה באמ"ן תרבות יוצאת דופן - מבריקה, חדשנית ומלאת הישגים. אבל לצד העוצמות, עולה סימן שאלה: האם מתחים בין עבר לעתיד, בין מחקר לטכנולוגיה, בין היררכיה לנועזות - יצרו מצב שבו קל יותר לשתוק מאשר להביע דעה אחרת? מה קורה כששפה לוחמנית ותחרותית זולגת פנימה גם לדיונים מקצועיים? איך משפיע המרוץ לקידום על הנכונות לקחת סיכון ולהשמיע קול שונה? והאם תחושת "המותג הבלתי מנוצח" חיזקה ביטחון עצמי - או דווקא פגעה ביכולת להטיל ספק? בסופו של דבר, השאלה היא פשוטה אך קריטית: האם התרבות הארגונית מעודדת את אנשי אמ"ן להעז ולחשוב אחרת, או דווקא גורמת להם לשתוק ברגעים שבהם הקול שלהם הכי נחוץ?

שיבוש אזרחי, מודיעין צבאי: כיצד העידן הדיגיטלי עיצב מחדש את אמ"ן

סא"ל (מיל') צחי דוידי, המכון לחקר המתודולוגיה של המודיעין

המאמר שלפניכם עוסק בהשפעת העידן הדיגיטלי על תהליכי פיתוח הידע באמ"ן, תוך בחינה של אימוץ טכנולוגיות ושיטות פעולה מהעולם האזרחי, ובפרט גישת ה"שיבוש". במאמר מראה סא"ל (מיל') דוידי, בוגר 8200 ויחל"ם, כיצד אימוץ מערכות דואר אלקטרוני, פלטפורמות מבוססות "משיכה", רשתות מידע מבוזרות וכלי בינה מלאכותית יצרו שיפור בתפוקה ובקצב העבודה, אך גם ערערו את מבני האחריות, הבקרה וההיררכיה באמ"ן. באופן זה, מתחקה דוידי אחר הפיכתה של 0028 מיחידת סיגינט ליחידת סב"ר, ובוחן את תהליך השחיקה במעמד הקב"רים ואת התמסמסות ההבחנה בין איסוף למחקר. הוא מציע לראות בשינויים הללו תוצאה של שילוב בין החלטות מלמעלה ובין יוזמות מלמטה, אך גם כתהליך שלא לווה במנגנוני תיקון ובחינה ביקורתית מספקת. לטענתו, אובדן חגורות ההגנה הפורמליות והבלתי פורמליות באמ"ן היה בין הגורמים לכשל המודיעיני באוקטובר 2023.

יוזמות אזרחיות מודיעיניות במלחמת ה-7 באוקטובר

סא"ל (מיל') דוד סימן טוב וגב' שובל בן-יאיר, המכון לחקר המתודולוגיה של המודיעין

במלחמת 7 באוקטובר הופיעו יוזמות אזרחיות שפעלו באופנים המזכירים תהליכי מודיעין קלאסיים - באיסוף מידע, עיבודו, ניתוחו והעברתו לשם פעולה. יוזמות אלה כללו חמ"לי מתנדבים לאיתור נעדרים וחטופים, התארגנויות לאיתור פעילות חמאס בסמוך לגבול, התארגנויות הסברה אזרחיות בזירה הבינלאומית, ומיזמים לניטור דיסאינפורמציה

והשפעה זרה ברשתות החברתיות. המאמר מתאר את יתרונותיהן: תגובה מהירה, שימוש ביכולות טכנולוגיות חדישות, וחדשנות ארגונית; לצד דילמות של פיקוח, סינכרון ואתיקה. תרומת המאמר חורגת מהתיעוד האמפירי, ומציעה חשיבה מחודשת על הגדרת המודיעין: לא רק כמערכת ממלכתית, אלא כתהליך חברתי רחב שמתרחש גם מחוץ למוסדות המדינה. מקרי הבוחן ממחישים את הפוטנציאל לשיתוף פעולה בין קהילת המודיעין ליוזמות אזרחיות, ואת הצורך במודלים מוסדיים שיאפשרו מענה מבוקר, משתף ואפקטיבי לאתגרי ידע במצבי חירום ולחימה.

Panel 2B: Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence, Room 2001

Chair & discussant: Dr. Amit Sheniak, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Discussant: Prof. Daphne Raban, University of Haifa

Decomposing Complexity: Human Cognition, Generative Artificial Intelligence, and the Navigation of Hybrid Security Threats

Dr. Adrian Wolfberg, Organizational Insight Consulting LLC

National security threats increasingly emerge as hybrid problems, combinations of simplicity, familiarity, novelty, complexity, and wickedness that challenge traditional analytic models. This paper proposes a new framework for addressing such threats by aligning the strengths of human cognition and generative artificial intelligence according to problem type. It argues that GenAI is well-suited to structured tasks, enabling human analysts to reallocate cognitive effort strategically. In contrast, unstructured problems require deep human engagement especially critical and creative thinking with limited support from GenAI. To improve analytic accuracy and early warning, the paper introduces a method for decomposing hybrid problems into more resolvable sub-hybrid forms along spatial/temporal dimensions. A retrospective analysis of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack illustrates how different phases of a single crisis correspond to distinct sub-hybrid types, each demanding a specific cognitive response. As hybrid problems grow in difficulty, the value of human insight increases while GenAI's utility decreases. The framework offers practical guidance for matching analytic effort to problem complexity and avoiding cognitive overreach by artificial systems. By orchestrating the division of cognitive labor, the approach advances more nuanced and adaptive national security methodologies.

GEOSHIELD: Enhancing Intelligence Analysis Through AI-Driven Geospatial Intelligence Fusion for National Security Applications

Dr. Yonit Rusho, Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence (IRMI), Mr. Noam Alon, IRMI, and Mr. Amit Dunsky

This paper examines GEOSHIELD, an AI-driven geospatial intelligence platform designed to enhance intelligence analyst capabilities in real-time threat assessment and situational awareness. As intelligence communities face exponentially increasing data volumes and evolving threats, AI integration presents opportunities and challenges for intelligence effectiveness. GEOSHIELD addresses critical gaps in multi-source intelligence fusion by combining natural language processing, machine learning classification, and geospatial analytics within a human-centered analytical framework. Through operational evaluation with intelligence professionals, the platform demonstrates measurable improvements in analytical speed (sub-3-second response), accuracy (91% multilingual event classification), and analyst satisfaction (86/100 usability score). GEOSHIELD successfully detected real-world intelligence events, including geopolitical developments and security incidents, validating its operational utility. This research contributes to understanding how AI can augment rather than replace human intelligence analysis, offering insights into AI system design, implementation, and oversight within intelligence organizations. The findings have direct implications for intelligence doctrine, analyst training, and future intelligence capabilities evolution

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Standing Out: Russia's Weaponization of Generative AI for Information Warfare

Dr. Huw Dylan and Ms. Elena Grossfeld, King's College London

Recent developments in generative AI have seen wide adoption across societies, governments, and institutions, and intelligence organizations are no exception. However, approaches to this technology diverge significantly. While the US, UK, and Israel primarily utilize AI for intelligence analysis and threat detection, Russia is uniquely weaponizing large language models for offensive operations, particularly in information warfare. Drawing on Snyder's "politics of eternity," this paper analyzes how Russia contaminates AI training data to propagate narratives of victimhood and mythologized pasts. Unlike traditional propaganda, these "poisoned" datasets create persistent distortions in collective digital memory, reshaping historical perception. Through comparative case studies, this research highlights Russia's exploitation of AI to undermine fact-based discourse, representing a sophisticated evolution in authoritarian infrastructure with parallels to Orwell's manipulated social memory in 1984. This contrast between Western analytical applications and Russia's weaponization underscores a critical divergence in the strategic implications of AI in state intelligence.

A Threat-Based Model of Public Trust: The Role of Artificial Decision-Making

Dr. Sharon Matzkin and Prof. Daphna Canetti, University of Haifa

Using original data from a survey conducted among Jewish Israelis exposed to real-time terror and rocket-fire just months after the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks on Israel, we investigate how the trauma of terrorism and perceptions of AI-based surveillance shape public trust in government institutions. Findings reveal that among directly exposed individuals, viewing AI as enhancing alertness fosters trust in government and intelligence agencies, reflecting a reliance on centralized authority during crises. Conversely, negative perceptions of AI—such as fostering complacency —undermine trust, particularly among indirectly exposed populations, who exhibit heightened scepticism. Surprisingly, non-exposed individuals report increased trust in intelligence agencies when AI is perceived as superior to human efforts, suggesting that distance from trauma amplifies trust in transformative technology. The findings highlight AI's double-edged role in democratic governance: it can enhance institutional trust when seen as effective but risks eroding trust when associated with ethical issues or overreliance.

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Panel 2C: Inhibited Learning in Intelligence, Room 1001

Chair & discussant: Col. (Ret.) Miri Eisin, Reichman University

Vagueness and Concealment in the Language of IDF Intelligence Reports

Ms. Adi Abramson, Bar-Ilan University

Intentional vagueness in language refers to rhetorical choices that appear to violate the Cooperative Principle in discourse. Deliberate use of various linguistic mechanisms enables writers to conceal information, avoid commitment, and fulfill additional functions. In Israeli military writing, vagueness has historically created misinterpretations of orders and intelligence, as highlighted by the Yom Kippur and Second Lebanon wars inquiry committees. This study examines syntactic and lexical vagueness strategies employed by Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN), based on an analysis of 239 reports alongside interviews with analysts. Findings indicate that analysts use vague language to achieve subsidiary aims beyond conveying information, such as protecting sources (e.g., using passive voice), hedging assessments, creating emotional distance and objectivity display (e.g., using euphemism and metaphors), and concealing Israeli operations. These methods are not meant to mislead readers but support intelligence workflows. The present study offers insight into intelligence writing as a sub-genre of military writing and can present practical implications for enhancing communication within the intelligence community and with decision-makers. Given the significance of these texts for Israel's national security, identifying features that influence comprehension is essential.

Intelligence Oversight, Deception and Failures: Lessons from the Lookout Frontline War Rooms

Prof. Ayelet Harel, Ben-Gurion University, and Prof. Shir Daphna-Tekoah, Ashkelon Academic College

Our research offers an in-depth investigation of intelligence oversights through the case of the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps and the frontline lookout war rooms in the Gaza Sector. The developments and processes that occurred at the margins of the intelligence collection process teach us important lessons that enable learning about the nature of failures and possibilities for improvement. What the political, military, and intelligence leadership failed to understand, Hamas understood fully: the frontline war rooms are critical, as are the soldiers operating and managing them. Therefore, on that fateful morning of October 7th, Hamas focused its attack on these war rooms and their cameras. A civil documentation project of the chain of events at the war rooms on the Gaza front prior to the surprise attack teaches about the politics of intelligence, the nature of Hamas' deception, ego battles, the power of documentation, and the danger of omitting facts and events from inquiry reports. It also demonstrates how intelligence commanders preferred their preconceptions to what could be observed directly. They preferred their assumptions to the reality revealed through the eyes. Documenting October 7th through the war rooms' experiences enables learning about key failures of Israel.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Brutality, and Its Disappearance: Where Did Gender-Based Violence Go in the October 7 Security Investigations?

Ms. Shira Barbibay-Shaham and Dr. Sarai Aharoni, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Between July 2024 and July 2025, Israeli media covered 29 internal investigations by the IDF, Shin Bet, and Military Intelligence into the October 7 attack. Conducted by current and former officers, these inquiries were partly communicated through press releases and briefings, often using diagrams, maps, and general data. Aside from the Be'eri battle report, none of the investigations—including those by the Shin Bet, Military Intelligence, and site-specific inquiries—are publicly available on the IDF website. Analysis of the available material reveals a stark omission: despite the centrality of sexual violence allegations in public, political, and diplomatic

discourse following the attack, the investigations make no direct reference to such acts. This study examines how the Israeli security establishment frames the October 7 events through its investigative language and methodology in assessing operational and intelligence failures. We explore how military discourse—both explicit terminology and coded references—shapes the boundaries of recognition for conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and how this framing contributes to its disappearance from official records. The findings raise critical questions about institutional silencing, secrecy, and the gatekeeping of historical narratives, as well as the broader implications for recognizing sexual violence as a tangible security threat in armed conflict and ensuring future protection of civilian.

Intelligence Transformation after Failure - The Case of the Jewish Intelligence in 1929 Palestine Turbulences

Mr. Yossi Dagan, Bar-Ilan University

The 1929 Turbulences in Palestine broke out in surprise, exposing the unpreparedness of both the British authorities and the Jewish community (Yishuv). In an apparently pre-coordinated attack, about 130 Jews were killed or massacred and several settlements were abandoned. These events shattered key beliefs of the Zionist leadership: the Dependence on the British for security and the hope for Jewish-Arab peaceful relationship. They also undermined the perceptions of a weak Arab national sentiment and their inability to carry out an organized resistance. At that time, misled by the mock silence, the small intelligence office of the Zionist Executive was disbanded on 1928, leaving the Yishuv with no centralized intelligence body to monitor the deterioration of 1928-9, and to provide early warnings. Shocked by the consequences, the "United Bureau" was established soon after to centrally handle Arab affairs, including intelligence, followed the Haganah in Jerusalem effort to monitor the telephone line of the Arab Executive Committee and the recruit of several Arab informants. The Bureau was later merged into the Jewish Agency's Political Department. In parallel, the Haganah underwent organizational reforms, including initial central and regional intelligence resources, which culminated in the founding of the national "Shai" (Intelligence Service) in 1940.


Post-Traumatic Organizational Growth and Transformation Recommendations: A Model for Growth and Transformation Following Crisis in Military and Intelligence Agencies

Dr. Oshri Bar-Gil, Rupin Academic Center


The research examines the potential for post-traumatic organizational growth in military and intelligence agencies following the October 7th, attack on Israel. Drawing on organizational trauma theory and empirical evidence from historical intelligence failures, we propose a three-layer model for facilitating organizational transformation beyond mere resilience. The analysis integrates the post-traumatic growth framework with organizational learning theory to demonstrate how security organizations can emerge stronger from catastrophic failures. The model encompasses three interconnected layers: leadership, organizational culture, and individual growth. At the leadership level, we identify five critical mechanisms: developing an updated organizational ethos, establishing adaptive communication systems, redefining organizational purpose, managing transformation pace and attention, and fostering enabling culture. The organizational culture layer emphasizes psychological safety, organizational mindfulness, inter-personal connections, and systematic learning processes. Individual growth manifests through enhanced meaning-making, strengthened belonging, improved self-efficacy, and identification of new opportunities. The model offers actionable strategies for intelligence and military leaders navigating the critical period between acute trauma and long-term recovery.

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על הדוברות והדוברים (לפי סדר ההופעה)
About the Speakers (by order of appearance)



Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash is the head of the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC). Previously, he served as Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) and of the IDF signal intelligence unit, 8200.



Adv. Devorah Chen is an attorney specializing in criminal, public, and security law. Between 1976 and 2004, she served in the State Attorney's Office. In her last position, she headed the Department for Criminal, Security and Special Affairs within the State Attorney's Office. In this capacity, she led the prosecution teams in all major criminal-security cases of that period, including key cases against leaders of terrorist organizations. Currently, Adv. Chen is a research fellow at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University.



MK Ram Ben-Barak is a former member of the Israeli security forces and an Israeli politician. He served as deputy director of the Mossad and director general of the Ministry of Intelligence and Strategic Affairs. Currently, he serves as a member of the Foreign Affairs & Defense Committee of the Knesset (Yesh Atid Party), which he also chaired in the previous Knesset (2021-2022).



FMK Yohanan Plesner serves as President of the Israel Democracy Institute since 2014. Prior to that, Plesner served as a member of the Knesset since 2007. Among other legislative responsibilities, he was a member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee and of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.